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Abstract The operant demand framework has achieved high levels of adoption as an approach to quantify how various ecological factors influence choice. A central goal of the framework proposed by Hursh and Silberburg (2008) was to isolate the “essential value” of reinforcers—namely, their effects on behavior given various contextual factors. The effect of reinforcers on behavior is a phenomenon that is expected to vary as a function of reinforcer magnitude/dosage (i.e., units of reinforcement), price (i.e., schedule requirements), the intensity of demand (i.e., consumption in free operant conditions), the availability of reinforcers (i.e., supply, presence of alternatives), and the individual's current and historical context. This technical report provides a historical summary of the concept, describes the quantitative basis for essential value in the framework of Hursh and Silberburg (2008), reviews prior attempts to extract a generalizable index of essential value, and presents a newer formulation using exact solution that provides a more succinct and durable index. Proofs and solutions are provided to clarify the bases for novel and existing representations of essential value. Recommendations are provided to improve the precision and accuracy of behavioral economic metrics as well as support consensus regarding their interpretation in the operant demand framework.

Abstract Organisms may sometimes behave as if a contingency exists between behavior and consequences, even if this is not actually the case. Killeen (1978) suggested that such superstition occurs because of factors that bias subjects to behave “superstitiously” rather than because of failures of discrimination. We systematically replicated Killeen's experiment and compared contingency discrimination between different consequences. Six pigeons responded in a matching‐to‐sample procedure in which a response‐independent or response‐dependent stimulus change, food delivery, or blackout occurred. The pigeons reported whether the consequence was response dependent or response independent by choosing between two side keys. Discrimination was strongest after stimulus changes, weaker after blackouts, and weakest after food deliveries. These differences persisted even after additional training, suggesting asymmetries that may reflect differences in the disruptive effects of different consequences on remembering and/or behavioral mnemonics. Importantly, the pigeons were not biased to report response‐dependent consequences unless that response was consistent with locational biases; that is, they behaved “superstitiously” when there was a reason to be biased to do so. These findings corroborate Killeen's and demonstrate that behavior may deviate from contingencies not necessarily because subjects cannot discriminate those contingencies but because they are biased to behave otherwise.